Introduction
Hamilton and Jefferson found tyranny in different places. Hamilton stood in staunch opposition to the "utopia" that was the pure, direct democracy of the "ignorant" masses. Jefferson, on the other hand, felt that pure democracy was preferable to representative government, which could be no better than a monarchy. While Jefferson's position was generally considered to be dangerous at the time, and Hamilton's caution would be woven into the Constitution, the tables have since turned, and greater voter participation in governance in the form of direct democracy has garnered significant standing in contemporary America. While the pairing of direct democracy and federalism would surely strike most of the founders as antithetical, the modern-day voter no longer appears to be phased by the juxtaposition that has now come to be regarded as central to good governance in the federal state. This conventional assumption in the literature on direct democracy is contradicted by the most prominently cited example of its success: California, whose dire fiscal situation suggests that direct democracy, may be the culprit, not the savior. This paper offers a repudiation of the conventional wisdom, and illustrates that direct democracy is in fact responsible for creating fiscal pressures at both the state and municipal levels that alter the federal balance of power. This paper explores the development of education finance reform in California through an examination of the narrative told by prominent ballot measures from the period of 1978 to 2012. During this period, drastic changes in the way education was funded not only altered California's ability to appropriate sufficient funds for education year after year, but also its ability to meet its other responsibilities.
Education finance reform was not the initiative of stoic legislators but rather voters. Empowered by the tools of direct democracy, voters went to the polls and decided on bills ranging from tax limitations to education finance. While the intentions and competency
The Federalist Voter 39 of voters is often questioned by social scientists , what is of particular interest is how direct voter participation in formulating state and local fiscal policy, or "ballot box budgeting," has worked to unduly hinder the California General Fund and to place mounting barriers against future attempts to reform already hamstrung education finance goals. These fiscal aspects are not solely limited to the capacity of the state to properly meet its obligations; more importantly, there are repercussions for the intergovernmental relations inherent in a federal state. This fact points to the overarching reality that direct democracy does not just have implications on the state and local level but on the federal, or national, level as well. So the question is: does direct democracy have a salubrious effect, as is the predominant view in the literature, or in fact a deleterious one? The simplest and clearest sub-model is the Triangle of Federalism, which conveys the principal opportunistic actions in a federal state. It is taken as axiomatic that government bodies and actors, like people, are self-interested and seek to maximize benefits while minimizing costs. The federal government, which lies at the top of the triangle, may fail to meet its obligations; however, the act of opportunism most commonly associated with it is encroachment, where it acts opportunistically to supersede or fill the vacuum of authority held or left by the states and municipalities. Conversely, states constitute the triangle's base. These actors tend to partake in two different kinds of opportunism: shirking, where a state fails to meet obligations to its constituents or to fulfill its agreed-upon role within the federal state; and burden shifting, where opportunistic behavior exports externalities to neighboring states.
Bednar presents another sub-model that ties into the previous one that she refers to as the "Safeguards of Federalism". The model involves complementarity, which she asserts makes federal states robust. These safeguards are traditionally pigeonholed into five primary categories: intergovernmental retaliation, structural safeguards, popular safeguards, political safeguards and judicial safeguards. Robust federal states are generally considered to possess the latter four in abundance and in overlap. Perhaps the most important aspect of this model is illustrating how opportunistic behavior is sanctioned (and thus discouraged). In a state where intergovernmental retaliation is the only "safeguard," there is abundant latitude for non-compliance while opportunistic behavior prevails. Only when punishment is triggered by flagrant violations must the offending state bear the full cost of intergovernmental retaliation, i.e.
war. However, with the addition of one or more safeguards, more egregious transgressions are minimized by the establishment of earlier triggering sanctions directly related to the degree of opportunism.
Essentially, this allows for minor opportunism while simultaneously providing for a functioning federal whole.
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Historically speaking, California lacked a strong civil society 1) (Allswang) that, if had existed, would have assisted in the formation of strong structural safeguards. However, distrust in governmental institutions prevailed, and in an attempt to compensate for ineffective government, greater power was given to its fledgling voter population.
The situation in California in the late 19 th and early 20 th century is indicative of an insufficient mild structural safeguard, where increasing opportunism by the corrupt legislature yielded higher utility despite receiving mild punishments (voting for new representatives frequently just brings more of the same). The Progressivist movement sought to combat the utility of non-compliance by the legislature and successfully pushed for the popular safeguard to become more easily and frequently triggered; birthing direct democracy's expanded popular safeguard into being.
The Narrative of Ballot Measures (1) Not Your Typical Tax Revolt, Proposition 13
Proposition 13 is considered to be the tipping point that set off the tax revolt not only in California, but also led to a series of successful tax reduction and limited government oriented ballot measures across the nation (Beito) (1976) . 2) He speculates that the passage of radical legislation such as Prop 13 cannot be properly explained by voter habits alone because of the surprisingly large margin of passage, almost 2 to 1, but also because similar tax limitation bills failed to pass in 1972 and 1968, both of which were rejected by a 2 to 1 margin (Serrano & Proposition 13).
The arrangement that was being challenged in Serrano (I) was one of school district funding. Education during this time was a wholly local matter; school districts were funded directly through local property taxes. However, the problem seen with the arrangement was that poorer municipalities, even those with higher property tax rates, could not afford to provide the same level of education funding richer municipalities could at lower tax rates, in effect unduly favoring the wealthy. The court ruled in 1971 (Serrano I) that the existing state funding was inadequate to bridge the divide between districts and offer equal opportunity of education to all California children, which the court felt was a fundamental constitutional right (New York State Archives).
The legislature took up the mantel of Serrano immediately after the ruling and passed the Property Tax Relief Act of 1972 (PTRA).
The new legislation essentially retained the pre-Serrano arrangement 2) For detractors see Stark and Zasloff.
The Federalist Voter 43 of funding education through property taxes, but changed the primary actor. Seeking to equalize spending among the districts, the new law placed a limit on the amount of revenue a school district could raise through local property tax, siphoning off excess revenue to poorer districts and it also created foundation programs where local funding would be supplemented by state aid (Karst) ; essentially breaking the connection between local property taxes and local school spending (Fischel) . Arguably, the most important aspect of Serrano (I) was it minimized the role local governments had traditionally played, as their revenues were requisitioned to support statewide equalization payments as the pendulum shifted to the state, it encroached on municipal powers. Proposition 8 applied to all property tax except for that portion which went to education while Proposition 13, on the other hand, was designed specifically to target the increased income tax routing from education funding (Fischel) . Fischel notes that school districts that were most affected by increased property taxes because of Serrano and AB 65 voted in a greater percentage for Proposition 13 (535-538). Proposition 13 was passed into law by 65% of voters (receiving a majority of support from both Democrats and Republicans) while Proposition 8 failed to pass, receiving only 47%.
3) Known less formally as the "Jarvis-Gann Amendment". 4) Known primarily by its sponsor Sen. Philip Behr as the Behr Bill.
The Federalist Voter 45
(2) The Unintended Consequences Essentially, Prop 13 prohibited ad valorem tax on real property from exceeding 1% of the value of any property and also restricted the increase of assessed value to 2% per annum or less and prohibited reassessment of property values without a change in ownership. Prop 13 also required that California state tax increases be approved by a two-thirds vote of the legislature and that local taxes initiatives be approved by two-thirds of the voters. Proposition 62 further amended this requirement in 1986 by establishing new requirements of a twothirds plurality by either the governing body or the voters for the adoption of new or increased taxes by local agencies. Both these measures would serve to make future efforts to raise taxes to support education funding harder to achieve, even as voters came to recognize their education system was underfunded.
The passage of Prop 13 had an immediate effect on California's budget. Prior to its passage, there was at least a 7 to 8 billion dollar surplus in the General Fund, however as a result of the precipitous drop in local revenues from the 1% property tax increase limit, the subsequent years were spent burning away the surplus to underpin municipal budgets. In total, it is estimated that Prop 13 saved voters, or starved the state of nearly $528 billion USD (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association).
Prop 13 had a devastating although not immediate effect on education in California. The use of the aforementioned state budget surplus kept local school districts afloat in the years following and worked for a time to allay fears that the educational system would unduly suffer. It can be reasoned though that while many Californians expected to see consequences from the passage of Prop 13, possibly some loss of state and local government services, this concern in the end did not hold a deep sway for voters concerned about keeping their homes (Martin, KPBS) .
Eventually, the growth of the General Fund, which had previously experienced an average annual growth of about 15%, could no longer keep up with yearly demands since anticipated future tax income was far short of that which was projected pre-Prop 13 (California Department of Finance). In addition, the state government's overall contribution to education funding declined because the state's obligation to fund school district equalization was done through property tax receipts, which was encumbered by the 1% limit on annual property tax increases. While local municipalities could no longer issue bonds to support education funding, 5) local governments became predominantly reliant on their ever-shrinking portion of California's stagnating General Fund, which failed to maintain consistent growth; oscillating between -15% to 15% on any given year (California Department of Finance). Prop 13 had the ultimate effect of neutering the mandates of Serrano and AB 65, making them nearly impossible to fund; the redistribution effects of the progressive legislation were short lived.
Whether intended or not, Prop 13 had the rapid effect of stripping education funding from the local domain, thrusting the woefully incapable state finances into the position of principal guarantor.
It was not just only the source of funding that changed. School 5) Because bonds are serviced by property tax receipts.
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finance reform brought about a perceived reduction in quality as well.
By 1985 state budget surplus payments to municipalities had run dry and the effect of limiting property taxes finally began to take its toll, which in turn, began a trend of per pupil spending reductions, diminishing from around $400 USD above the national average (Carroll).
1985 also marked the year California's per pupil funding began to fall below the national average (Chapman 16) . In comparison to the 1960s, when California was consistently ranked as one of the best states nationally in several measures of student and school performance, the 1980s saw the significant decline of California's standings in those statistics. By the 1990s California would rank near the bottom in terms of per pupil spending, $600 USD below the national average by 2000 (Carroll). In the face of these reductions, school districts chose to hire fewer teachers, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the pupil-teacher ratio, which had a negative effect on the quality of education in California public schools (Sonstelie) .
The change in the quality of the educational system was not lost on voters and it became clear that state and local governments possessed no administrative remedy to address problems in the failing education system and earlier judicial rulings that favored educational equity were preempted by ballot measures. By the late 1980s voters had perceived a transgression by the state government, and initiative campaigns to fix the education problem were underway. While five initiative attempts at education finance reform did not make it onto the final ballots between 1980 and 1984, the electorate's appetite for election funding reform was sufficiently whetted to place Proposition 98, a K-14 funding bill, on the 1988 November ballot. Since the new, rather complex appropriation formulas take several factors into account, they are liable to changes throughout the year, and consequently the minimum guarantee of education funding fluctuates. To meet the mandates of the preceding years, it is the responsibility of the Governor to provide additional funds. However, it is interesting to note that because of changes to ERAF (Educational Revenue Augmentation Fund) property taxes in the early '90s the actual percentage of General Fund revenues set for education is closer to 34% rather than the mandated 40% .
While Prop 98 was passed in reaction to the dire fiscal consequences
Prop 13 had on the budget, in retrospect it did little to improve the education-funding problem in California. Chapman remarks that, "Prop 98 has acted as more of a ceiling than a floor" (16). In fact, it limited more than expanded funding. For example, if the legislature decided to provide education funding above the minimum guarantee, that additional fund must be factored into account for the next year's 7) Placed limits on the growth in appropriations made by state and local governments. Also mandated that in state and local governments must return tax revenue to taxpayers if the annual amount exceeds the appropriation for that year. An addendum to the tax reduction measures begun by Prop 13. 8) One to be utilized during years of strong earnings while the other during years of slow or negative growth. Since the passage of Prop 111, the original 39% minimum formula has not been utilized. 9) Thus far, the legislature has suspended the minimum guarantee for funding only Act of 1993 did much to dampen concern over the ability of the system to adequately support itself. Accordingly, federal block grants to California and localities increased substantially during this period.
In 1998 the first non-bond education related bill appeared on the 10) While Prop 111 could not be characterized as an unfunded mandate as could Prop 98, the way Prop 111 was marketed and whom it targeted (trucking industry) offered great appeal to voters.
June ballot, however Proposition 223 was clearly an anti-education bill.
It 
(5) Bond Finance Practice in California
The practice of bond issuance to finance government is likely the least understood fiscal responsibility entrusted to voters. In California, the practice of putting bond issuances up to a public vote in support of various programs and proposals essentially allows the government to take on new public debt (of course, it is assumed the voter understands that they will be paying back the face value of the bonds plus interest through tax revenues). Nevertheless, even while lacking appropriate knowledge voters are faced with approving these measures at the state and local levels nearly every election cycle. This 
. Priest (1971) (Serrano 1); and (Serrano II) (1976).
As it was during the adoption of the common school model in the 19 th century, the aggrandizement of state roles before the 1970s was largely structural rather than fiscal . As local school districts had the primary responsibility for funding, they would frequently issue general obligation bonds as a means of meeting spending obligations. However, Prop 13 changed local school districts' ability to pay back their bond indebtedness through the levying of property taxes, since it was now limited to 1% of assessed valuation for both K-12 and higher education. California was no exception -its budget deficit for K-12 education amounted to nearly $3.5 billion USD for FY 09. Indeed, California's reliance on federal funding to shore up its education budget was never as acute as it was during this period. It has been estimated that without ARRA stabilization funding, which ultimately restored budget equilibrium, over 6,300 schoolteachers in Los Angeles alone would have been furloughed without pay due to municipal and state education budget shortfalls (U.S.
Department of Education, Report by the Domestic Policy Council).
It is reasonable to believe that since California is one of the most populous states it would receive a greater proportion of federal assistance dollars than other, less populated states. And indeed, the data bears this assumption out; moreover, it shows that not only did Essentially, the practice of bond issuance has made California more susceptible to fluctuations in its budget as well as downturns in the economy. As the recession made abundantly clear, relying on bonds as a significant source of education financing is an inherently flawed strategy. This trend has been driven largely by voters, who generally have remained blissfully unaware of the pitfalls their state and local governments will likely face in repaying future debt, and who are for the most part willing to support their educational institutions given that their perceived individual financial burden is low. This is not to say, however, that running up debt is necessarily a bad thing; indeed, it may be that the renewed interest in issuing local bonds that took hold during the past decade has had a mostly salubrious effect, as it has begun to reverse the strong trend towards centralization in
California by reverting fiscal tools to local governments. These benefits notwithstanding, carrying heavy debt does nevertheless create at least some fiscal weakness, and that in turn may invite greater federal budgetary participation.
Fiscal Federalism
In examining the trend of education funding in the United States (1) Observing the Expanded Popular Safeguard
While much of this paper has been to explore the narrative of education finance reform, in some ways this paper is also a thoughtexperiment on how the expanded popular safeguard works. The popular safeguard is essentially the will of the electorate. Steadfast supporters of direct democracy assert that by expanding voters' ability to sanction, the expanded popular safeguard would essentially become a complementary safeguard that makes government more responsive.
The expanded popular safeguard does work well to punish perceived institutional incompetence or inaction. When it seems that legislators are not properly representing their constituencies, initiatives campaigns are launched in a heartbeat. While institutional barriers such as signature drives and sufficient funds to run a PR campaign limit the frequency of its use, the use of the initiative nevertheless has continued to enjoy a heyday. In fact, the ease by which the expanded popular safeguard can be triggered in and of itself poses a problem. In this light, the frequently triggering and strong punishment it delivers to governing bodies like the legislature, local councils and other offices serves to make it more difficult for these institutions to function. While it is true that the expanded popular safeguard provides incentives for the legislature to offer bills that assuage voter concerns over a controversial or difficult issues it also provides cause
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for the legislatures to avoid difficult topics or to refer politically liable bills to the public for a vote. In California, the frequent use of the expanded popular safeguard has created a voter population sensitive to perceived transgressions in state and local governance.
The focus of Californian voters on personal tax burdens suggests continued problems stemming from a mal-developed civil society.
This continued distrust has affected a bipartisan collection of voters, and has helped to maintain the distrust in state institutions. ability to practice mild to medium levels of opportunism vis-a-vis transgression. Accordingly, it is important to note that the rudimentary popular safeguard is a more tempered and moderate version of the people's will. While voters are not able to directly craft laws, their indirect hedging against institutional actors can create a powerful counterbalance -one that is not too harsh and does not punish too frequently. While the framers of the Constitution were not perfect, they did worry about the potentially excessive power of factions and sought to create veto points between the will of the people and the executors of government. While the primary trend has been to largely alleviate these pressure points, by allowing for the direct election of senators and increasing enfranchisement, the expanded popular safeguard places the collective voter in the position of executor of government -as opposed to the original system, which was devised not just to prevent governmental tyranny, but also to prevent popular tyranny (Griffin) .
While direct democracy clearly has many desirable effects on American society, including increased community engagement, heightened transparency, greater governance and issue awareness by voters, all essential aspects of a robust democracy; there is little evidence to suggest that direct democracy has a positive effect on a state's ability to manage its budget. This is not because voters are spiteful or antagonistic, but rather because they are self-interested, and therefore vote in such a manner. This is not necessarily compatible with effective governance. The institution of direct democracy in the case of California has been a contributing factor in creating fiscal pressures at both the state and municipal levels resulting in an ongoing alteration in the balance of power in the federal state; with the consequential effect of making state and local governments more reliant on the federal government.
In California, direct democracy allowed for the passage of laws that limited the ability of local governments to fund education. The This paper has bridged a connection between increased fiscal reliance and direct democracy. In the case of California, ballot budgeting has unmistakably created severe fiscal problems in the state. With a particular focus on education, it is evident that attempts to increase the quality of education through direct democracy has not only had the opposite effect of diminishing the prospects of a quality education system but has had far reaching effects on all parts of the Californian budget. The problem with ballot box budgeting stems in large part from questionable voter competence in understanding what they are voting for and an overriding, keen awareness of their tax burden.
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While most voters do not advocate for limited government, the basic idea that people want more but also want to pay less is apparent.
This rational choice has been one of the driving factors behind state finance driven by direct democracy. While the last thing on the minds of California voters was to effectively increase the federal role while usurping power away from their local governments, direct democracy in California has accomplished just that.
